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Risk Preference, Time Preference, and Salience Perception 
Jonathan Leland  Mark Schneider 
A model of decision making is introduced that provides a unified approach to choices under risk and over 
time. This model of salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP) predicts systematic departures 
from expected utility and discounted utility using the same mathematical structure and the same 
psychological intuition. SWUP explains six parallels between risk and time: (i) the common ratio effect and 
common difference effect; (ii) the common consequence effect and cancellation effect; (iii) the peanuts 
effect and magnitude effect; (iv) the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes and bias toward concentration; (v) a 
downside risk framing effect and opportunity cost framing effect; and (vi) the gain-loss labeling effect and 
the date-delay labeling effect. SWUP assigns weights on utility differences that depend on their importance 
(their probabilities of occurrence and their proximities of occurrence) and their salience or similarity, and 
so provides a bridge between rational and heuristic representations of decision making. 
1. Introduction 
In 1937 Paul Samuelson proposed that individuals might choose between consumption plans such 
that they maximize their discounted payoff or “utility” (DU) from future consumption. A decade later, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) proposed that people choose between risky prospects as if they 
maximize their expected utility (EU). To this day, these models constitute the standard theories of rational 
choice over time and under risk in the social and behavioral sciences. Nevertheless, almost from their 
inception, persistent questions have been raised regarding their descriptive accuracy. Friedman and Savage 
(1948) objected to the standard assumption in Expected Utility theory that people are uniformly risk averse 
while Allais (1953) raised questions regarding the descriptive accuracy of the EU independence axiom. 
Strotz (1955) critiqued Discounted Utility theory, expressing concern that people would be unable to 
commit themselves to future plans resulting in time-inconsistent choices.  
The challenges to the descriptive adequacy of EU and DU raised by Allais, Strotz, and others have 
defined the research agenda on individual decision making for over a half a century. Alternative models 
have been proposed for risky choice while a very different set of models has been proposed for 
intertemporal choice to accommodate the EU and DU anomalies. However, relatively few models have 
emerged to explain behaviors in both domains, potentially because risk and time preferences are thought to 
reveal very different aspects of behavior: Time preferences reveal some measure of impatience, while risk 
preferences reveal an individual characteristic of risk-tolerance. 
More recently, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) have pointed out parallels between anomalies under 
risk and over time, suggesting that there might be a fundamental link between behaviors in these domains. 
Subsequent work suggests the link involves the way differences in payoffs and probabilities and payoffs 
and dates of receipt across alternatives are evaluated and perceived. Rubinstein (1988) noted that an 
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individual choosing to receive $3000 over a lottery offering an 80% chance of winning $4000 might, in 
violation of the independence axiom, choose  a lottery offering a 20% chance of $4000 over a 25% chance 
to win $3000 because the probabilities of 0.25 and 0.20 appear similar in value. Leland (2002) noted that, 
by the same reasoning, an individual choosing to receive $20 in 1 month over receiving $25 in 2 months 
might, in violation of the stationarity axiom of DU, choose $25 in 12 months over $20 in 11 months if a 
delay of 11 months appears similar to a delay of 12 months. Recent work by Bordalo et al. (2012) on the 
influence of salient payoff differences in risky choice and Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) on the impact of 
focusing on large attribute differences in intertemporal choice lends further credence to the idea that 
differential weighting of attribute differences may connect risky and intertemporal behavior. 
Building on this possibility, we propose here a unified approach to modeling risky and 
intertemporal choice  in which behavior in both domains is driven by the interaction between properties of 
preferences (which are assumed to satisfy expected utility for risk and discounted utility for time), 
properties of salience perception (which are assumed to satisfy diminishing sensitivity to absolute changes 
and increasing sensitivity to proportional changes in attribute values), and the frame in which choices are 
presented (which determines what differences are compared across alternatives). We then show that simple 
operations on a frame generate a comprehensive set of behaviors observed under risk and over time. 
2. Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations 
 We proceed to model choices in three steps, first providing a formal theory for the framing of risky 
and intertemporal choices, then specifying the evaluation process or computational decision algorithm 
agents employ to choose between alternatives, and then characterizing the nature of salience perceptions 
that drive the evaluation. Taken together, we refer to our model of the choice process, characterization of 
the perceptual system, and treatment of frames as Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP).    
2.1  Frames for Lotteries and Consumption Plans 
For the purposes of developing a comparative model of risky and intertemporal choice we begin 
by representing the options in a presentation or frame as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Presentations or “Frames” for Decisions under Risk and over Time 
 
 
Choice Frame for Lotteries  
 (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  (xi,yi) (pi,qi)  (xn,yn) (pn,qn)  
      𝐩 x1 p1 x2 p2 … xi pi … xn pn  
𝐪  y1 q1 y2 q2 … yi qi … yn qn  
 
 
 
Choice Frame for Consumption Plans  
 (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (xi,yi) (ri,ti)  (xn,yn) (rn,tn)  
r x1 r1 x2 r2 … xi ri … xn rn  
t  y1 t1 y2 t2 … yi ti … yn tn  
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In our setup, for decisions under risk, there is a finite set, 𝑋, of outcomes. A lottery is a mapping 
𝑝: 𝑋 → [0,1] such that ∑ 𝑝(𝑥) = 1𝑥∈𝑋 . Denote the set of all lotteries by ∆(𝑋). We consider one-dimensional 
arrays 𝐩 and 𝐪 which represent lotteries 𝑝 and 𝑞 (in a well-defined sense) that offer a finite and equal 
number of outcomes denoted 𝐱𝐢 and 𝐲𝐢, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, where each 𝐱𝐢 occurs with probability 𝐩𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐢 
occurs with probability 𝐪𝐢.  Denote the support of a lottery, 𝑝 (the set of outcomes for which 𝑝(𝑥) > 0) by 
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑝), and denote the number of outcomes in the support of a lottery 𝑝 by |𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑝)|. 
For decisions over discrete time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, a consumption plan, r, is a sequence 
of dated outcomes in 𝑋. Denote the set of consumption plans by 𝐶. We study choices between consumption 
plans r and t where 𝑟: = (𝑥0, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑇) and 𝑡: = (𝑦0, 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑇). We consider one-dimensional arrays 𝐫 and 
𝐭 which represent consumption plans 𝑟 and 𝑡 that offer a finite and equal number of outcomes, where each 
outcome 𝐱𝐢 occurs in time period, 𝐫𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐢 occurs in period 𝐭𝐢, for all 𝑖. We use bold font for attributes 
in an array and italicized font for attributes in the support of a lottery or consumption plan.  
 To represent a lottery, 𝑝, we employ a one-dimensional array, 𝐩, consisting of 𝑛(𝐩) outcomes and 
𝑛(𝐩) corresponding probabilities. Denote the ith outcome in 𝐩 and the ith corresponding probability by xi 
and pi, respectively. Notice that outcome-probability pairs appear in no particular order in the array and 
some outcomes could be repeated in the array. Hence, many arrays could represent the same lottery.  
Definition 1 (Representation of a lottery): An array 𝐩 is a representation of lottery 𝑝 if (i) and (ii) hold:  
(i) For i =1,2,…,𝑛(𝐩), ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 1 
(ii) For all i such that xi = x, ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 𝑝(𝑥). 
Note that a representation 𝐩 of lottery 𝑝 differs from the lottery itself since it permits the same outcome to 
appear more than once in the array provided that the corresponding probabilities sum to the overall 
probability of that outcome.  Representations of two lotteries presented jointly, constitute a frame.   
Definition 2 (Frame for lotteries): A presentation or frame, ⟦𝐩, 𝐪⟧ of lotteries, 𝑝 and 𝑞, is a matrix 
containing a representation 𝐩 of 𝑝 and a representation 𝐪 of 𝑞. 
 In our analysis, we will consider cases where both representations in a frame have the same 
dimension, although this dimension can vary across frames.   
Similarly, let any 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶 be represented in a one-dimensional array, 𝐫, consisting of 𝑚(𝐫) outcomes 
and 𝑚(𝐫) periods. Denote the ith outcome in 𝐫 and the ith corresponding period by xi and ri, respectively.  
Definition 3 (Representation of a consumption plan): Array 𝐫 is a representation of 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶 if (i)-(iii) hold:  
(i)    For any dated outcome, 𝑥𝑡 ≠ 0, the pair (𝐱, 𝐭) is in 𝐫 if and only if 𝑥𝑡 is in 𝑟. 
(ii)   For any dated outcome 𝑥𝑡 = 0, if the pair (𝐱, 𝐭) is in 𝐫 then 𝑥𝑡 is in 𝑟. 
(iii)  If there are T dated outcomes in 𝑟, then dim(𝐫) ≤ 2T. 
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         A representation 𝐫 of consumption plan 𝑟 differs from the consumption plan itself since it permits 
periods of zero consumption to be ‘compressed’ (an outcome of zero and its corresponding time period 
might not be in 𝐫). In addition, there is no restriction on the order in which the outcomes in 𝑟 appear in 𝐫. 
Finally, property (iii) implies that 𝐫 contains at most all T outcomes and the corresponding T periods.  When 
two representations of different consumption plans are presented together, they constitute a frame.   
Definition 4 (Frame for consumption plans): A presentation or frame, ⟦𝐫, 𝐭⟧ of consumption plans, 𝑟 and 
𝑡, is a matrix containing a representation 𝐫 of 𝑟 and a representation t of 𝑡. 
We next consider the framing of degenerate lotteries (those yielding a single outcome with 
probability 1). Consider a choice between a lottery 𝑝 yielding x with certainty and a non-degenerate lottery 
𝑞. It seems almost unavoidable that one compares each outcome in 𝑞 to the unique outcome in 𝑝. We adopt 
the convention that a choice with a degenerate lottery is framed as in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Choice Frame with a Degenerate Lottery  
 
 
\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We present a model of decision making in which choices are predicted given the frame. In illustrating our 
model, we clearly specify the frame, employing the simplest presentation of choices for each example where 
outcomes of a non-degenerate lottery are monotonically ordered for choices under risk and in which time 
periods are monotonically ordered for choices over time.  
2.2 Salience Weighted Utility for Decisions under Risk 
Let there be a preference relation, ≻, over ∆(𝑋) reflecting the decision maker’s preferences over lotteries. 
The decision maker is assumed to have standard expected utility preferences: For all lotteries 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋),  
(1) 𝑝 ≻ 𝑞 if and only if  ∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑢(𝑥) > ∑ 𝑞(𝑦)𝑢(𝑦)𝑦∈𝑋𝑥∈𝑋 . 
This is the conventional approach. Next, we ask how might an individual evaluate presentations of lotteries 
like the ones in Figure 1? An extensive literature in economics and psychology has demonstrated that even 
small changes in presentations can have consequential effects on behavior. To allow for this possibility, let 
i = 1, 2, …,n index the location of the ith attribute (payoff, probability) in a frame. 
The decision maker is given two arrays and is asked to choose one. Here we consider a second 
relation ≻̂ over representations conditional on the frame which may be viewed as a ‘perceptual relation’ 
(rather than a preference relation). That is, 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 (𝐩 ~̂ 𝐪) means that lottery 𝑝 ‘looks strictly better than’ 
(‘looks equally as good as’) lottery 𝑞 when a frame ⟦𝐩, 𝐪⟧ presents the lottery pair {𝑝, 𝑞}.     
 For the generic frame in Figure 1, given (1), an unbiased perceptual relation can be expressed as:  
         (𝐱𝟏, 𝐲𝟏) (𝐩𝟏, 𝐪𝟏) (𝐱𝟐, 𝐲𝟐) (𝐩𝟐, 𝐪𝟐) …   (𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) (𝐩𝐢, 𝐪𝐢) … (𝐱𝐧, 𝐲𝐧) (𝐩𝐧, 𝐪𝐧) 
𝐩  𝐱 𝐩𝟏 𝐱 𝐩𝟐 … 𝐱 𝐩𝐢 … 𝐱 𝐩𝐧 
𝐪  𝐲𝟏 𝐩𝟏 𝐲𝟐 𝐩𝟐 … 𝐲𝐢 𝐩𝐢 … 𝐲𝐧 𝐩𝐧 
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(2) 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪  if and only if  ∑ 𝐩𝐢𝑢(𝐱𝐢) > ∑ 𝐪𝐢𝑢(𝐲𝐢)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,  
for all 𝐩, 𝐪, such that 𝐩 is a representation of 𝑝 and 𝐪 is a representation of 𝑞 and for all 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋).  
To account for the role of salience perception in decision making, we let the decision maker use a 
“salient” evaluation defined over frames when deciding between alternatives. In particular, salient 
comparisons between alternatives may frustrate the expression of the decision maker’s true preferences. 
The decision maker may instead be systematically swayed by changes in the arrangement of attributes in a 
frame which systematically make some comparisons focal and which make others inconsequential. Rather 
than assuming that choices always ‘reveal preferences,’ our approach admits two possibilities whenever the 
relations ≻ and ≻̂ are not equivalent: In any given situation (i) choices may reveal preferences (consistent 
with ≻) or (ii) they may reveal systematic deviations from preference maximization due to biases in salience 
perception (consistent with ≻̂).  
To further motivate the possibility that frames may frustrate the expression of preference, note that 
equations (1) and (2) provide an alternative-based evaluation - one lottery is strictly preferred to another, 
if and only if it yields a greater expected payoff to the decision maker.  Here we allow for the possibility 
that agents choose by making across-lottery comparisons of payoffs and their associated probabilities of 
occurrence. Building on Leland and Sileo (1998), note that the alternative-based evaluation in (2) may be 
written equivalently as an attribute-based evaluation such that  𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 if and only if (3) holds: 
(3)  ∑ [(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))/2 + (𝑢(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢)/2] > 0.
𝑛
𝑖=1  
Note that the evaluation procedures in (2) and (3) operate over frames rather than over lotteries directly. 
Nevertheless, (2) and (3) both characterize frame-invariant preferences (they are not sensitive to changes 
in frames). The attribute-based evaluation in (3) computes probability differences associated with outcomes 
weighted by the average utility of those outcomes plus utility differences of outcomes weighted by their 
average probability of occurrence. A decision maker who chooses among representations according to the 
attribute-based evaluation in (3) will be indistinguishable from one who chooses according to the 
alternative-based evaluation in (2). But now suppose that in the process of comparing risky alternatives an 
agent notices when the payoff in one alternative is “a lot more money” than the payoff in another and when 
one alternative offers “a much better chance” of receiving an outcome than the other. In these cases, we 
will assume that large differences in attribute values across different alternatives are perceived as 
particularly salient or attract disproportionate attention and are overweighted in the evaluation process. To 
capture this intuition that larger differences in attributes are over-weighted or attract disproportionate 
attention, we place salience weights 𝜙(𝐩𝐢, 𝐪𝐢) on probability differences and 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) on payoff differences, 
yielding the following model of salience-weighted evaluation, in which 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 if and only if (4) holds:  
(4)      ∑ [𝜙(𝐩𝐢, 𝐪𝐢)(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))/2 + 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢)/2] > 0.
𝑛
𝑖=1    
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We refer to model (4) as Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP). Note that SWUP has a dual 
interpretation as a model of salience-based choice that overweights large differences and as a model of 
similarity-based choice that underweights small differences. 
2.3 Salience Weighted Utility for Decisions over Time  
The model extends analogously to choices over time such as those in the lower panel of Figure 1. 
Let i = 1,2,…,n denote the position of the ith attribute (payoff, time period) in a frame. For decisions over 
time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, a consumption plan, r, is a sequence of dated outcomes in 𝑋. Denote the 
set of consumption plans by 𝐶. Let 𝑟: = (𝑥0, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑇) and 𝑡: = (𝑦0, 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑇). As in the discounted utility 
model, a decision maker has a preference relation, ≻𝑡, over consumption plans such that for all 𝑟, 𝑡 ∈ 𝐶, 
(5)    𝑟 ≻𝑡 𝑡 if and only if  ∑ 𝛿
𝑡𝑢(𝑥𝑡) > ∑ 𝛿
𝑡𝑢(𝑦𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑇
𝑡=0 , 
where 𝛿 ∈ (0,1] is a constant discount factor.  
The decision maker is now given two arrays and is asked to choose one. Here we consider the 
relation ≻̂𝑡 over representations of consumption plans, given the frame. The relation ≻̂𝑡 may be viewed as 
a ‘perceptual relation’ (i.e., 𝐫 ≻̂𝑡 𝐭 (𝐫 ~̂𝑡  𝐭) means that 𝑟 ‘looks strictly better than’ (‘looks equally as good 
as’) 𝑡 when a frame ⟦𝐫, 𝐭⟧ presents the pair of consumption plans {𝑟, 𝑡}).       
For the generic frame in Figure 1, given (5), a perceptual relation can be expressed as follows:  
(6)    𝐫 ≻̂𝑡 𝐭  if and only if  ∑ 𝛿
𝐫𝐢[𝑢(𝐱𝐢)] > ∑ 𝛿
𝐭𝐢[𝑢(𝐲𝐢)]
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑚
𝑖=1 ,  
for all 𝐫, 𝐭, such that 𝐫 is a representation of 𝑟 and 𝐭 is a representation of 𝑡 and for all 𝑟, 𝑡 ∈ 𝐶.  
The alternative-based evaluation in (6) is equivalent to an attribute-based evaluation in which 
𝐫 ≻̂𝑡 𝐭  if and only if (7) holds:  
(7) ∑ [(𝛿𝐫𝐢 − 𝛿𝐭𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢
𝑚
𝑖 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))/2 + (𝑢(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))(𝛿
𝐫𝐢 + 𝛿𝐭𝐢)/2] > 0. 
Placing salience weights 𝜃(𝐫𝐢, 𝐭𝐢) on time differences and 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢) on payoff differences, yields a 
salience-weighted evaluation in which 𝐫 ≻̂𝑡 𝐭 if and only if:  
(8)    ∑ [𝜃(𝐫𝐢, 𝐭𝐢)(𝛿
𝐫𝐢 − 𝛿𝐭𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢
𝑚
𝑖 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))/2 + 𝜇(𝐱𝐢, 𝐲𝐢)(𝑢(𝐱𝐢) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))(𝛿
𝐫𝐢 + 𝛿𝐭𝐢)/2] > 0.   
We refer to an agent who chooses according to salience-based evaluation models (formulas 4 and 8) as a 
focal thinker since such an agent focuses on salient differences in attributes. Such an agent chooses the 
alternative which ‘looks better’, with respect to that agent’s perceptual system. Note that whether one 
alternative ‘looks better’ than another to an agent, according to ≻̂, depends on the agent’s risk preferences 
and time preferences (as measured by 𝑢 and 𝛿, respectively) and the salience agents ascribe to large versus 
small differences in payoffs, time delays, and probabilities (as measured by 𝜇, 𝜃, and 𝜙, respectively). In 
this respect, SWUP provides a bridge between economic and psychological approaches to decision making 
by modeling choice as dependent on both properties of preferences and properties of the perceptual system.  
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In SWUP, differences in attributes are weighted by their salience and by their importance. The 
earlier similarity models (e.g., Rubinstein 1988, 2003; Leland 1994, 2002) evaluated differences only by 
their similarity or salience and so are very non-compensatory. In contrast, the classical economic models 
weight attributes by their ‘importance’, where payoffs are effectively assigned higher importance if they 
are more likely to occur (represented by their probability weight in expected utility theory) or if they are 
nearer to the present (represented by their discount factor in discounted utility theory). In SWUP, the 
probability differences (𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢) are assigned an ‘importance weight’ of (𝑢(𝐱𝐢) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢))/2 (probability 
differences are more important if they correspond to larger average payoffs), and likewise utility differences 
are weighted by (𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢)/2 (assigning greater importance to payoffs with larger average probabilities) for 
decisions under risk and by (𝛿𝐫𝐢 + 𝛿𝐭𝐢)/2 (assigning greater importance to payoffs with larger average 
discount factors) for decisions over time. In this respect, SWUP provides a unified approach to heuristic 
models of attribute-based choice and to classical models of rational choice since SWUP includes both a 
‘salience weight’ and an ‘importance weight’ on differences in payoffs, probabilities, and delays.   
2.4   The Nature of Salience Perceptions 
The salience functions 𝜇, 𝜙 and 𝜃 determine the only ways in which a focal thinker differs from a 
rational agent who chooses over arrays according to formulas 2 and 6. We assume a salience function 
exhibits the two properties of the perceptual system in Definition 5, defined by Bordao et al. (2013). 
Definition 5 (Salience Function): A salience function σ(a, b) is any (non-negative), symmetric1 
and continuous function that satisfies the following two properties: 
1. Ordering: If [𝐚′, 𝐛′] ⊂ [𝐚, 𝐛] then σ(𝐚′, 𝐛′) < σ(𝐚, 𝐛).  
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): For any 𝐚, 𝐛, 𝛜 > 0, σ(𝐚 + 𝛜, 𝐛 + 𝛜) < σ(𝐚, 𝐛). 
While properties 1 and 2 define a salience function, consistent with Bordalo et al. (2013), we will also allow 
for the possibility that a salience function satisfies a third property, increasing proportional sensitivity:   
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS): For any 𝐚𝐛 > 0 and any 𝛂 > 1, σ(𝛂𝐚, 𝛂𝐛) > σ(𝐚, 𝐛).  
There is an intuitive relationship between these properties: DAS implies for a fixed absolute difference, that 
the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios. IPS implies for a fixed ratio, that perception is more 
sensitive to larger absolute differences. Ordering implies that perception is more sensitive to larger intervals 
(which have both a larger absolute difference and a larger ratio than the smaller intervals they contain).   
Ordering, DAS, and IPS are also supported by the psychology literature. Ordering is consistent 
with the “symbolic distance” effect - it takes longer to answer which of two numbers is larger, the smaller 
                                                          
1 A function 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) is symmetric if 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐱).  
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their arithmetic difference.2 Since the Weber-Fechner law was introduced in the 19th century, it has also 
been recognized that diminishing (absolute) sensitivity is a fundamental property of the perceptual system 
that applies across a range of sensory modalities including tone, brightness, and distance (Stevens, 1957). 
Schley and Peters (2014) provide experimental support that diminishing sensitivity also characterizes how 
the brain maps symbolic numbers onto mental magnitudes. Support for the IPS property can be found in 
the marketing literature, where IPS is referred to as "the unit effect".  Pandelaere et al. (2011), for example, 
find that the perceived difference between ratings of 7 and 9 on a 0-10 scale appears smaller than the 
difference between 700 and 900 on a 0-1,000 scale. Similarly, Wertenbroch et al. (2007) report that, even 
when $1 (in US currency) equals S$1.70 in Singapore currency, “a target price of S$1.70 will appear as 
less expensive when evaluated against a target budget of S$17.00 than $1 against $10” (p. 3). 
3.  Parallels between Behavior under Risk and over Time 
We now consider the implications of SWUP for risky choice and intertemporal choice. We show 
that even a parameter-free version of the model simultaneously predicts a wide variety of analogous 
behaviors between risk and time. To begin, we let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and we adopt the following parameter-free 
specifications for the salience functions that satisfy ordering and diminishing sensitivity: 
(9)                             𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) =
|𝐱 − 𝐲|
|𝐱| + |𝐲| + 𝟏
, 𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪) =  
|𝐩 − 𝐪|
𝐩 + 𝐪
, 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) =
|𝐫 − 𝐭|
𝐫 + 𝐭
                          
The payoff salience function 𝜇 is the only one of the salience functions that may take negative values as its 
arguments, and there also might be two zero payoff values in the same column vector of a frame. The 
specification for 𝜇 ensures that the salience function3 is defined even if 𝐱 = 𝐲 = 0. It also satisfies 
increasing proportional sensitivity. In our analysis, we do not embed a constant in the salience functions 
for probabilities or delays for simplicity, although doing so would not affect our qualitative results.  Each 
of the specifications in (9) is a special case of the salience function σ(𝐱, 𝐲) = |𝐱 − 𝐲|/(|𝐱| + |𝐲| + λ) 
proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012), in which 𝜆 ≥ 0. Having fixed the utility and salience functions, the time 
discount factor 𝛿 (which we let be the annual discount factor) is the only parameter that may vary, and so 
we report the full range of 𝛿 values consistent with each behavior for each example. Somewhat surprisingly, 
our ‘parameter-free’ specification of the salience functions is sufficient to predict all behaviors studied in 
this paper, even with linear utility, and even if 𝛿 is fixed at a plausible annual discount factor (e.g., 𝛿 =
0.9). We provide a more formal treatment of the behaviors discussed in this section in the appendix.  
  
                                                          
2 For example, Moyer and Landauer (1967) found that it takes adults longer to answer the question "Which number 
is larger, 2 or 3?" than to answer the question "Which number is larger, 2 or 7?" 
3 The time salience function might also compare two payoffs in period 0 and so we define 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) as in (9) when it is 
not the case that 𝐫 = 𝐭 = 0 and we set 𝜃(𝟎, 𝟎) = 0. 
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3.1       The Common Ratio Effect and the Common Difference Effect 
We begin with two of the best-known anomalies for choices under risk and over time: the special 
case of the common ratio effect known as the certainty effect and the special case of the common difference 
effect known as present bias. The certainty effect is a systematic violation of expected utility theory. A 
classic example due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3. 
Figure 3. The Common Ratio Effect (Risk) and the Common Difference Effect (Time) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figures in Section 3, the typical choice patterns are highlighted in bold font. In Figure 3, a 
decision maker chooses between lotteries p and q and between p′ and q′. Lottery p offers $3000 with 
certainty. Lottery q offers an 80% chance of receiving $4000. Expected utility theory predicts a decision 
maker will choose either p and p′ or q and q′. However, most subjects choose p and q′. Under SWUP, this 
pattern of choices is predicted since the salient comparison is between $3000 and $0 in the choice between 
p and q which favors p, and the salient comparison is between 3000 and 4000 in the choice between p′ and 
q′ which favors q′. The preference for p and q′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification in (9).  
The right panel of Figure 3 displays an example of present bias based on Read and Scholten (2012). 
A decision maker chooses between a ‘smaller sooner’ (SS) option and a ‘larger later’ (LL) option when the 
SS payment is immediate and when both the SS and LL payments are delayed by 24 months. Discounted 
utility theory predicts a decision maker who prefers $510 today (SS) to $530 in two months (LL) will also 
prefer $510 in 24 months (SS′) to $530 in 26 months (LL′). However, in such choices, most people choose 
SS and LL′. Under SWUP, the salient comparison is between receiving a payment in period 0 versus in two 
months for the choice between SS and LL, but the salient comparison is between $510 and $530 for the 
choice between SS′ and LL′. The choice of SS and LL′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification 
in (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.90, 0.99]. We define the common difference effect more generally in the appendix and 
prove the following result which holds for any utility functions and any salience functions.  
Proposition 1:  A focal thinker exhibits the common difference effect if and only if  𝜃 satisfies DAS.  
Note that under SWUP, the certainty effect and present bias are both driven by a comparison against 
0 (comparing $3000 to $0 and comparing a zero time delay to a 2 month delay). 
  
            Common Ratio Effect                      Common Difference Effect 
 
 
            $        prob.       $      prob.                             $      month      
p 3000 0.80 3000 0.20    SS 510 0 
q 4000 0.80 0 0.20    LL 530 2 
         
p′ 3000 0.25 0 0.75    SS′ 510 24 
q′ 4000 0.20 0 0.80       LL′ 530 26 
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3.2 The Common Consequence Effect and the Cancellation Effect 
A second parallel between risk and time preferences concerns the common consequence effect for 
decisions under risk (Allais, 1953) and the cancellation effect for choices over time (Rao and Li, 2011).  
Figure 4 displays a prototypical example of each effect. The common consequence effect violates the 
independence axiom of expected utility, while the cancellation effect violates a similar independence 
condition (the cancellation axiom) of discounted utility theory. 
Figure 4. The Common Consequence Effect (Risk) and the Cancellation Effect (Time) 
 
 
 
In the common consequence example from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a decision maker 
chooses between lotteries p and q and between lotteries p′ and q′. Lottery p offers $2400 with certainty, and 
q offers a 33% chance of $2500, a 66% chance of $2400 and a 1% chance of $0. Expected utility theory 
predicts a decision maker will choose either p and p′ or q and q′. However, most subjects choose p and q′. 
Under SWUP, this pattern of choices is predicted since the salient comparison is between $2400 and $0 in 
the choice between p and q, and the salient comparison is between 2500 and 2400 in the choice between p′ 
and q′. That is, the comparison between $2400 and $0 that is cued in the first choice is not cued in the 
second choice. The choice of p and q′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification in (9).  
The right panel of Figure 4 displays a prototypical example of the cancellation effect. In such 
examples, SWUP predicts a shift in preference from the sooner to the delayed option when the common 
consequence of -$520 in 1 month is added to both options. Similar preference reversals were observed by 
Rao and Li (2011). A violation of cancellation holds if SS′ is chosen over LL′, but LL is chosen over SS. 
The preference for SS′ and LL is also predicted4 by our specification in (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.80, 0.99].  
 
  
                                                          
4 Our results are robust to whether the choice between SS and LL is represented as in the more compact frame 
shown below: 
   SS 510 0 -520 1 
  LL -520 1  530 2 
 
         Common Consequence Effect (Risk)                            Cancellation Effect (Time) 
 
 
            $        prob.       $      prob.        $     prob.                      $     month     $     month     $     month 
p 2500 0.33 2400 0.66 0 0.01     SS 510 0 -520 1   0 2 
q 2400 0.33 2400 0.66 2400 0.01    LL 0 0 -520 1 530 2 
               
p′ 2500 0.33 0 0.67      SS′ 510 0     
q′ 2400 0.34 0 0.66         LL′ 530 2     
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3.3        The Peanuts Effect and the Magnitude Effect 
To further investigate the relationship between risky and intertemporal choices as formalized by 
SWUP, we turn to an unresolved paradox in the literature: In their ‘common approach’ to risk and time, 
Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) could not simultaneously explain the peanuts effect in risky choice 
(Markowitz, 1952) and the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice. Prototypical examples of these effects 
are illustrated in Figure 5. In the peanuts effect, behavior shifts from risk-seeking at small stakes to risk 
aversion at larger stakes. In the magnitude effect, behavior shifts toward greater patience at larger stakes.  
Figure 5. Illustrations of the Peanuts Effect and the Magnitude Effect 
                                The Peanuts Effect (Risk)       The Magnitude Effect (Time) 
                       $               prob.            $            prob.                                             $          period 
R 1 0.10 0 0.90  SS 2 0 
S 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.90  LL 3 1 
         
R' 1000 0.10 0 0.90  SS' 200 0 
S' 100 0.10 100 0.90  LL' 300 1 
 
 
The difficulty in reconciling these two effects has been that the peanuts effect reveals decreasing sensitivity 
to payoffs at larger stakes, whereas the magnitude effect reveals increasing sensitivity to payoffs at larger 
stakes. Even for decisions under risk, the most widely used specification of prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) does not explain the peanuts effect. The literature following Prelec and Loewenstein has 
not resolved the dilemma and the difficulty in reconciling the peanuts effect and the magnitude effect has 
been viewed as strong evidence that the same utility function cannot apply to both risky and intertemporal 
decisions. SWUP provides a partial resolution – when one of the options in the peanuts effect is a certain 
option (the type of situation where the peanuts effect is most likely to be observed), SWUP simultaneously 
explains the peanuts and magnitude effects. The left panel of Figure 5 illustrates the peanuts effect in which 
a person prefers a 10% chance of winning $1 over a guaranteed ten cents, but prefers a guaranteed $100 
over a 10% chance of winning $1000. The peanuts effect in Figure 5 is driven by a conflict between 
decreasing absolute sensitivity and increasing proportional sensitivity. At low stakes, the influence of 
increasing proportional sensitivity dominates (the comparison of a dime versus a dollar is more salient than 
that between a dime versus nothing). However, at larger stakes, the influence of decreasing absolute 
sensitivity dominates (the comparison of receiving $0 instead of a guaranteed $100 can be more salient than 
that between $100 and a small chance of $1000). For choices over time, the right panel of Figure 5 illustrates 
the magnitude effect in which a person prefers $2 now to $3 in one year, but prefers $300 in one year to 
$200 now. Both effects hold under our parameter-free specification from (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.86, 0.93]. 
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3.4 Skewness Preference for Risk and Time 
In this section, we demonstrate that SWUP predicts a preference for positive skewness and an 
aversion to negative skewness in the distribution of payoffs for a lottery and in the distributions of payoffs 
for a consumption plan. This preference for skewness is predicted by SWUP to generate the fourfold pattern 
for choices under risk (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and to generate a bias toward concentration for 
choices over time (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013). The preference for skewness under risk explains the 
simultaneous purchasing of lottery tickets and insurance policies. The preference for skewness over time 
explains, for instance, the perception, that a newspaper subscription cost of 60 cents per day seems less 
expensive than a subscription of $219 per year.  
Skewness Preference for Time (Bias toward Concentration): We show that the ordering 
property of salience perception can explain a pattern of behavior that Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), describe 
as a bias toward concentration: People prefer alternatives with a small number of large advantages relative 
to options with a large number of small advantages. In the context of intertemporal choice, such a bias 
toward concentration may explain behaviors like addiction in situations where the benefits of consumption 
are immediate and the costs of current consumption are distributed over many future dates. Conversely, it 
implies future-biased behavior when the benefit of many periods of effort is concentrated on a single goal 
(as in a career achievement).  
To illustrate such behavior, consider a decision maker given the choice between a large immediate 
payment of $219 for an annual newspaper subscription, or daily future payments of $0.60 for a year. 
Considering the undiscounted case (i.e., 𝛿 = 1), the two options both have a value of $219, but a bias 
toward concentration implies that a decision maker will strictly prefer the financing option of $0.60 per 
day. As a second example, consider a decision maker deciding between two donation options to a charity 
he supports: One option recommends that he make a donation of $240 today (Plan A). Another option 
recommends he donates just $20 per month (Plan B). These two options are illustrated in Figure 6.   
Figure 6.  Charity Donation Framing Effect (Undiscounted case) 
 
A focal thinker deciding between Plan A and Plan B in Figure 6 will favor Plan B. Note that this 
inclination will hold, even if the large immediate payment is lower than $240. For instance, suppose the 
payment in Plan A is $225. Then under our parametric specification from (9), a bias toward concentration 
(choice of Plan B) holds for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.88, 0.97] even though Plan A offers higher discounted utility. To 
 (x0,y0) (r0,t0) (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (x12,y12) (r12,t12)  
A -240 0 0 1 0 2 … 0 12  
B 0 0 -20 1 -20 2 … -20 12  
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see why the bias toward concentration arises, note that Plan A has one large disadvantage and many small 
advantages relative to Plan B. In contrast, Plan B has a single large advantage of avoiding the immediate 
payment. For the undiscounted case, SWUP predicts a strict preference for B if and only if (10) holds:   
(10)    𝜇(−240,0)(−240) + 𝜇(−20,0)(20)(12) < 0. 
Inequality (10) holds if and only if 𝜇(−20,0) < 𝜇(−240,0). Since [−20,0] ⊂ [−240,0], the preference for 
Plan B follows directly from the ordering property in Definition 5.  We can formalize a bias toward 
concentration more generally as follows: 
Definition 6 (Bias Toward Concentration): For frame ⟦𝐀, 𝐁⟧ presenting consumption plans {𝐴, 𝐵} and 
frame ⟦𝐀′, 𝐁′⟧ presenting plans {𝐴′, 𝐵′} in Figure 7, a bias toward concentration (BTC) holds if there exists 
𝐧∗ ≥ 1 such that for all 𝐧 > 𝐧∗,  A ≻̂ B and A′ ≻̂ B′ for all 𝑥 > 0, while B ≻̂ A and B′ ≻̂ A′ for all 𝑥 < 0. 
Figure 7.  Bias Toward Concentration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A bias toward concentration implies a form of present bias when concentrated gains are immediate, and 
future bias when concentrated gains are remote. The example of a bias toward concentration in the lower 
panel of Figure 7 may be characteristic of a form of goal-seeking behavior, such as the case of a junior 
faculty member who foregoes small payoffs from leisure and social activities over many periods while 
focusing on the goal of obtaining tenure. For the undiscounted case, such behavior follows from ordering.  
 
Proposition 2:  Let 𝛿 = 1 and 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits BTC if 𝜇 satisfies ordering.  
Skewness Preference for Risk (The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes): A robust property of 
observed choices under risk is the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. A decision maker who exhibits the 
fourfold pattern displays “risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability and risk 
seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability” (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, p. 297). A 
prototypical example is given in Figure 8. This pattern is predicted by SWUP under the specification in (9). 
We also define the fourfold pattern more generally in the appendix and prove the following result: 
 (x0,y0) (r0,t0) (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (xn,yn) (rn,tn)  
A 𝐧𝐱 0 0 1 0 2 … 0 𝐧  
B 0 0 𝐱 1 𝐱 2 … 𝐱 𝐧  
 (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (xn,yn) (rn,tn) (xn+1,yn+1) (rn+1,tn+1) 
A′ 0 1 0 2 … 0 𝐧 𝐧𝐱 𝐧 + 𝟏 
B′ 𝐱 1 𝐱 2 … 𝐱 𝐧 0 𝐧 + 𝟏 
14 
 
Proposition 3:  Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes if 𝜇 satisfies 
ordering, DAS, and IPS.  
Under SWUP, the fourfold pattern can be summarized as a preference for positively skewed 
lotteries (as they have a large upside potential) and an aversion to negatively skewed lotteries (since they 
have a large downside risk). Analogously, the bias toward concentration can be summarized as a preference 
for positively skewed consumption sequences and an aversion to negatively skewed consumption sequences.  
Figure 8.  The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the fourfold pattern for risk, a decision maker smooths payoffs (or hedges risk) when a 
lottery or investment opportunity is negatively skewed (as in frames (i) and (iv) in Figure 8), and spreads 
payoffs (or embraces risk) when the lottery is positively skewed (as in frames (ii) and (iii) in Figure 8). This 
can explain both a preference to purchase insurance against low-probability losses and a preference to 
purchase lottery tickets for low-probability gains. Similarly, for choice over time, this prediction can 
rationalize both a preference for installment plans (paying $19.99 per month instead of a single payment of 
$225 per year, even though the latter is less expensive) and a preference for lumps-sum payments over 
annuities (even if the former are heavily taxed relative to the latter). SWUP thus makes the novel prediction 
that the degree of consumption smoothing will differ for gains and losses, and that this will be analogous 
to how the propensity for hedging risk differs for upside and downside risk.   
 
3.5        Framing Opportunity Cost and Downside Risk 
Frederick et al (2009) find that people do not spontaneously consider opportunity costs, but will do 
so when prompted. One recent example in intertemporal choice is the finding by Magen et al. (2008) that 
people do not naturally consider the opportunity costs of immediate consumption, but they are more likely 
to do so, when that opportunity cost is salient. Magen et al. refer to this finding as the ‘hidden zero effect’. 
We will also illustrate an analogous hidden zero effect predicted by SWUP for decisions under risk.   
Risk Aversion for high-probability Gains      Risk Seeking for high-probability Losses 
(i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)      (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐩 𝟗𝟗 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 𝟗𝟗 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏       p −99 0.99 −99 0.01  
q 100 0.99 0 0.01        𝐪 −𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗 𝟎 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏  
 
 
 
Risk Seeking for low-probability Gains          Risk Aversion for low-probability Losses             
 
(iii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)   (iv) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
p 1 0.01 1 0.99   𝐩 −𝟏 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 −𝟏 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗  
𝐪 𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝟎 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗   q −100 0.01 0 0.99  
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Framing the Opportunity Costs of Impatience (The Hidden Zero Effect for Time): Recent 
work in intertemporal choice (Magen et al., 2008; Read and Scholten, 2012; Read et al., 2017) has observed 
that making the opportunity costs of choosing the sooner payoff more salient systematically shifts choices 
toward more patient behavior. This ‘hidden zero effect’ is difficult to explain in a standard model of context-
independent behavior. However, SWUP provides a natural explanation for this framing effect. To illustrate, 
consider the consumption plan frames in Figure 9, where the top frame conceals the zero payoffs and the 
bottom frame reveals them. In the simpler (top) frame in Figure 9, the comparisons cued by the frame are 
between 510 and 530 and between receiving a payoff in period 0 versus in 2 periods from now. Since the 
salience of time differences (now versus 2 periods) is greater than the salience of payoff differences, a focal 
thinker will be inclined to select the sooner option. In contrast, the comparisons cued by the ‘salient 
opportunity cost’ (bottom) frame are between payoffs of 510 and 0 and between 530 and 0 (highlighting 
the opportunity cost of choosing the sooner option and receiving 0 instead of 530), while time differences 
are less salient. Since the most salient difference (530 versus 0) favors the delayed option, a focal thinker 
will be inclined to select the more patient option. Under our running parametric specification from (9), the 
hidden zero effect for time holds for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.80, 0.99]. The explanation of the hidden zero effect given 
by SWUP is also consistent with the finding that shifting attention from time delays to monetary amounts 
induces more patient behavior (Fisher and Rangel, 2014).   
Framing Downside Risk as Probabilities or Outcomes (The Hidden Zero Effect for Risk): An 
analogous hidden zero effect is predicted by SWUP for decisions under risk. To illustrate, in Figure 9, the 
downside risk of choosing 𝑝 over 𝑞 in the simpler (top) frame is represented by the comparison between 
probabilities (the reduction in probability of winning from 0.34 to 0.33). In the ‘salient downside risk’ 
(bottom) frame, the downside risk is represented by the comparison between outcomes (the risk of receiving 
$0 instead of $2400). The origin of the hidden zero effect is implicit in Savage’s (1954) classic book on 
subjective expected utility theory. Savage proposes that Allais paradox violations of expected utility can be 
reduced if the prospect format used by Allais is changed into a decision matrix which makes the normative 
appeal of the independence axiom more transparent. Savage’s reframing hypothesis implies the hidden zero 
effect since the choice between p′ and q′ in the top frame in Figure 9 is also part of a classic example of the 
common consequence effect used by Kahneman and Tversky. Replacing the top frame in Figure 9 with the 
bottom frame produces the type of presentation format that Savage suggested will reduce violations of 
expected utility. Evidence consistent with the hidden zero effect for risk was observed in a number of papers 
(e.g., Harless (1992), Leland (2010)). In such cases, SWUP predicts that framing downside risk as outcomes 
will induce more risk-averse behavior than framing downside risk as probabilities. This effect also holds 
for the specification in (9).  
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Figure 9. Hidden Zero Effects predicted by SWUP for choices under Risk and over Time 
 
 
 
3.6  Labeling Effects for Risk and Time Preferences 
Even though a focal thinker has stable preferences, SWUP also predicts systematic label framing effects 
in which risk and time preferences shift in a predicted direction when changing the labeling of outcomes 
from gains to losses or when changing the labeling of time periods from time delays to calendar dates.  
Framing Effects between Positive and Negative Frames: Consider one of the most famous 
examples of a framing effect, due to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), in which respondents are told that the 
U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an epidemic which is expected to kill 600 people. Policy makers must 
choose between two prevention strategies: Program A saves 200 lives. Program B has a 1/3 chance of 
saving 600 people and a 2/3 chance of saving no one. A different group of respondents was given a choice 
between Programs C and D, and were told that if Program C is taken, then 400 people will die. If Program 
D is taken, then there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3 chance that all 600 people will die. 
The frames of both decisions are given in Figure 10. 
Programs A and C differ only in how the outcomes are labeled (as lives saved or lives lost) and 
are thus logically equivalent. This observation also holds for Programs B and D. However, most people 
chose A over B and chose D over C, thereby exhibiting a framing effect.  
The traditional explanation for this framing effect is due to a value function that is concave for 
gains and convex for losses. SWUP provides a different perspective. Under SWUP, Program A is chosen 
over Program B if saving 0 lives versus saving 200 lives is more salient than saving 200 lives versus 600 
lives. In addition, D is chosen over C if having 0 deaths versus 400 deaths is more salient than having 400 
deaths versus 600 deaths. Formally, for 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, a focal thinker chooses Program A over Program B if 
𝜇(200,0) > 𝜇(200,600). Analogously, the focal thinker chooses Program D over Program C if 
𝜇(−400, −600) < 𝜇(−400,0). Both of these inequalities hold for the parameter-free specification from 
(9). SWUP thus yields the choice for A over B in the ‘lives saved’ frame and the choice for D over C in the 
‘lives lost’ frame, as observed by Tversky and Kahneman.  
 
         Hidden Zero Effect (Risk)                                             Hidden Zero Effect (Time) 
         (Downside Risk Framing)                                              (Opportunity Cost Framing) 
 
 
 (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)            (x1,y1)   Months   
p′ 2500 0.33 0 0.67     SS 510 0   
q′ 2400 0.34 0 0.66     LL 530 2   
             
 (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2) (x3,y3) (p3,q3)          (x1,y1)  Months   (x2,y2)  Months 
p′ 2500 0.33 0 0.01 0 0.66   SS 510 0 0 2 
q′ 2400 0.33 2400 0.01     0 0.66  LL 0 0 530 2 
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Figure 10. Framing Effect between Positive and Negative Frames 
 
 
                     (x1,y1)          (p1,q1) (x2,y2)     (p2,q2) 
    Program A 200 lives saved 1/3 200 lives saved 2/3 
      Program B 600 lives saved 1/3 0 lives saved 2/3 
 
                     (x1,y1)     (p1,q1)             (x2,y2)     (p2,q2) 
                       Program C 400 people will die 1/3 400 people will die 2/3 
                     Program D 0 people will die 1/3 600 people will die 2/3 
 
 
Framing Effects between Date and Delay Frames: The format in which time periods are presented can 
also significantly affect the degree of discounting. For instance, Read et al. (2005) identified a robust 
framing effect in which they observed more patient behavior when time periods were presented as calendar 
dates than when they were presented as delays (numbers of weeks or months) prior to the receipt of a 
monetary reward. An example of this ‘date-delay effect’ from their experiment is presented in Figure 11. 
Read et al. found that subjects typically opted for $370 in 17 weeks instead of $450 in 56 weeks in the delay 
frame, but preferred the delayed $450 payment when the same time interval was presented in calendar dates. 
If the salience of calendar dates can be approximated in this example by the comparison between 2003 and 
2004, then under SWUP, the framing effect is explained, if 𝜃(17,56) > 𝜃(2003,2004), which can be 
shown to be implied by the properties of ordering and diminishing sensitivity of the time salience function 
𝜃. Thus, SWUP not only predicts a date-delay framing effect, but it predicts the effect in the observed 
direction. Moreover, under SWUP, this context-dependent shift in discounting is driven by changes in 
salience perception and is predicted even if the decision maker has stable time preferences. Under our 
running parameter-free specification, the date-delay effect is predicted by SWUP for all 𝛿 ∈ [0, 0.95].   
Figure 11. The Date-Delay Framing Effect in Intertemporal Choice 
 
 
4.          The Etiology of Choice under Risk and over Time 
In addition to showing in Section 2 that SWUP applies the same mathematical structure and the 
same psychological intuition to choices under risk and over time, we demonstrated in Section 3 that SWUP 
predicts a set of analogous behaviors across the two domains. These behaviors are summarized in Table 1. 
The predicted set of behaviors has strong empirical support and has not previously been explained in a 
unified model. In addition, the same simple parameter-free specification explains each of these effects. 
 
(x1,y1) Delay (Weeks)                           (x1,y1)     Date 
SS 370 17  SS 370 September 26, 2003   
LL 450 56 LL 450         June 25, 2004   
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Although relatively short, the list of analogous behaviors between risk and time summarized in 
Table 1 is surprisingly comprehensive. Moreover, all of these behaviors can be explained by SWUP as 
salience effects. Thus all behaviors in Table 1 can be explained through the same underlying mechanism – 
systematic overweighting of differences in payoffs, probabilities, and time delays, where the weights are 
endogenous and satisfy basic properties of human salience perception. Interestingly, all of the context-
dependent shifts in risk-taking and time discounting summarized in Table 1 are explained even if the 
decision maker has stable (context-independent) risk and time preferences given by 𝑢 and 𝛿.   
 
Table 1. Parallels between Risk and Time Predicted by SWUP  
Operations on Lottery Frames The Etiology of Choice under Risk Representative Reference 
 
Add Common Consequence 
 
Common Consequence Effect 
 
Allais (1953) 
 
Scale Probabilities by Constant 
 
Common Ratio Effect (Certainty Effect) 
 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
 
Scale Outcomes by Constant 
 
Peanuts Effect 
 
Markowitz (1952) 
 
Change Skewness of Distribution 
 
Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes 
 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 
 
Change Salience of Downside Risk 
 
Hidden Zero Framing Effect (Risk) 
 
Savage (1954) 
 
Change Attribute Labels 
 
Gain-Loss Framing Effect 
 
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) 
   
Operations on Temporal Frames The Etiology of Choice over Time Representative Reference 
 
Add Common Consequence  
 
Cancellation Effect 
 
Rao & Li (2011) 
 
Add Constant to Time Periods 
 
Common Difference Effect (Present Bias) 
 
Laibson (1997) 
 
Scale Outcomes by Constant 
 
Magnitude Effect 
 
Prelec & Loewenstein (1991) 
 
Change Skewness of Distribution 
 
Bias Toward Concentration 
 
Koszegi & Szeidl (2013) 
 
Change Salience of Opportunity Cost 
 
Hidden Zero Framing Effect (Time) 
 
Magen et al. (2008) 
 
Change Attribute Labels 
 
Date-Delay Framing Effect 
 
Read et al. (2005) 
 
 
Table 1 also displays the formal operations one can perform on a lottery or consumption plan to transform 
it into a different lottery or consumption plan and the corresponding behaviors predicted by SWUP to 
result from each operation. Regarding the anomalies in Table 1, note that the certainty effect and standard 
present-biased behavior in smaller-sooner versus larger-later choices are special cases of the common 
ratio effect and the common difference effect, respectively.  
 
5.      Related Literature  
Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) were the first to recognize parallels between the major anomalies 
for risk and time. For instance, they recognized an intuitive relationship between the common ratio effect 
and the common difference effect, and between the peanuts effect and the magnitude effect. They also 
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recognized the role of IPS and DAS in explaining some of these anomalies. However, the model they 
proposed does not explain the peanuts effect or any of the anomalies in sections 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 or 3.6. In the 
present paper, we have extended the discussion of parallels between risk and time to include the common 
consequence effect and the cancellation effect, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes and a bias toward 
concentration, the hidden zero effects for risk and time, and framing effects due to changing the labeling of 
attributes. In addition to the striking similarity in these behaviors for risk and time, we have shown that 
these effects are each predicted by SWUP. 
Aside from the early contribution of Prelec and Loewenstein, the standard approach has been to 
develop domain-specific models. For instance, the major models for choice under risk such as rank-
dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982), and prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) were developed only for risk preferences. Similarly, the major 
models for choice over time such as the hyperbolic discounting model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), 
Laibson’s (1997) model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and the recent advance by Koszegi and Szeidl 
(2013) were developed only for time preferences.    
The strong parallels that SWUP predicts for risky and intertemporal choice enables SWUP to 
explain behavior in choices over time that cannot be explained by cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which does not apply to intertemporal choice. Even for choice under risk, 
there are notable differences between SWUP and CPT. For instance, CPT does not explain the downside 
risk framing effect depicted in Figure 9, and the most commonly applied version of CPT with a power value 
function cannot explain the peanuts effect, even allowing for any probability weighting function. 
To provide a unified explanation of choices under risk and over time, models by Leland (2002) and 
Rubinstein (2003) advocated an approach based on similarity judgments. That approach can explain present 
bias, and is analogous to the earlier models of similarity judgments that explain the common ratio effect 
(Rubinstein, 1988; Leland, 1994). Although these similarity models were based on a strong psychological 
intuition, they were largely qualitative, based on the notion of a similarity relation without formalizing 
when two payoffs or time delays were similar or different. Bordalo et al. (2012) pioneered an approach to 
choice under risk which provided a quantitative approach to formalizing aspects of salience perception. A 
fundamental structural difference between the model of Bordalo et al. and SWUP is that the Bordalo et al. 
model only accounts for the salience of payoffs, whereas SWUP incorporates both the salience of payoffs 
and the salience of probabilities. In addition, Koszegi and Szeidl’s model accounts only for the salience of 
payoffs, whereas SWUP incorporates both the salience of payoffs and the salience of time delays. By 
accounting for probability salience, Leland, Schneider, and Wilcox (2017) extend SWUP to choice under 
uncertainty and demonstrate that diminishing sensitivity of the probability salience function explains 
ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox which is not accounted for by the model of Bordalo et al. 
20 
 
(2012). Similarly, by accounting for time salience, we establish in Proposition 1 that diminishing sensitivity 
of the time salience function explains standard present bias behavior as illustrated by the common difference 
effect that is not accounted for by the model of Koszegi and Szeidl (2013). 
Of behaviors in Table 1, quasi-hyperbolic discounting explains only present bias and the model of 
Koszegi and Szeidl explains only a bias toward concentration. Koszegi and Szeidl write: 
“Yet because our theory does not match evidence in single choices, it is not a complete theory of 
choice over time, and a complete theory would have to incorporate hyperbolic discounting or a 
related model as well.” (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013, p. 85). 
 The SWUP model provides a unified explanation for the six behaviors for intertemporal choice 
summarized in Table 1 as resulting from a perceptual system that is biased to focus on salient differences 
in payoffs and time delays and also predicts a directly analogous set of six broad empirical findings for 
choice under risk.  Rather than relying on quite distinct domain specific models (e.g., prospect theory for 
risk, quasi-hyperbolic discounting for time), SWUP provides a unified approach to choices under risk and 
over time. However, SWUP is also an incomplete theory as it does not account for interaction effects 
between risk and time that have been observed for choices involving both risk and delays (Keren and 
Roelofsma, 1995; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Hardisty and Pfeffer, 2017).  
 In the recent literature, attention has turned to integrating risk and time preferences. This literature 
was pioneered by Halevy (2008) who developed a model that accounts for some systematic interactions 
between risk and time (based on experimental results that risk affects time preference). Perhaps the most 
successful model to date in providing a unified treatment of risk and time preference is the probability time 
tradeoff (PTT) model of Baucells and Heukamp (2012). Notably, the PTT model accounts for three 
systematic interaction effects between risk and time preferences when choices involve both risk and time 
delays as well as some other fundamental behaviors such as the common ratio and common difference 
effects. Although SWUP does not account for interactions between risk and time, it encompasses a broader 
set of parallels between risk and time than previous approaches and explains all 12 behaviors in Table 1. 
6. Conclusion 
Choices under risk and over time have traditionally been studied separately, and the notions of impatience 
and risk tolerance are distinct concepts. The model of salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP) 
proposed here generalizes the classic expected and discounted utility models to predict endogenous changes 
in the salience of payoffs, probabilities, and time delays. Surprisingly, under SWUP, the same mathematical 
structure and the same psychological intuition predict a wide range of analogous behaviors between risky 
and intertemporal choice and unify these behaviors as examples of salience effects. Moreover, the 12 
context-dependent shifts in risk taking and time discounting we have studied are predicted by SWUP, even 
if salience weights are parameter-free, and even if the decision maker has stable risk and time preferences.  
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Appendix: Formal Results for Behaviors under Risk and over Time 
In this appendix, we provide more formal discussions of the behaviors illustrated by example in 
Section 3. For our results, we consider the case where both options in the frame have equal expected utilities 
(for risk) and equal discounted utilities (for time) to highlight the predictions arising from differences in 
salience.  For a focal thinker, we write the expected utility of lottery 𝑝 (the agent’s assumed preferences in 
the absence of salience distortions) as 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) and the discounted utility of consumption plan 𝑟 as 𝐷𝑈(𝑟). 
Also, in our analyses to follow, the definitions of behaviors are adapted to our setting (using the perceptual 
relation ≻̂ from Section 2 which depends on both the agent’s preferences and the agent’s salience 
perception, instead of the agent’s preference relation ≻).  
 
A.1 The Common Consequence Effect  
We first provide a more formal definition of the common consequence effect  
Definition 7: (Common Consequence Effect): Consider the frames in Figure 13, where 𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, 𝐪 >
𝐩, and 𝐪, 𝐩 ∈ (0,1). The common consequence effect holds if 𝐪 ≻̂ 𝐩 and 𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐪′. 
 
 
       Figure 13. The Common Consequence Effect 
          𝐩 𝐱 𝐩 𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐪 𝟎 𝐪 − 𝐩 
          𝐪 𝐲 𝐩 𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐪 𝐲 𝐪 − 𝐩 
       
          𝐩′ 𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩   
          𝐪′ 𝐲 𝐪 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐪   
 
 
 
Proposition 4: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the common consequence effect if and 
only if 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪).  
Remark: For both the classic Allais example in which (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($5 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, $1 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, 0.10, 0.10), 
and for the Kahnemman and Tversky example in Figure 4, the condition in Proposition 4 holds for the 
salience functions in (9). For the Kahneman and Tversky example, the necessary and sufficient condition 
in Proposition 4 becomes 𝜇(0,2400) > 𝜇(2500,2400) > 𝜙(0.33,0.34). That is, the common consequence 
effect holds if the perceived downside of receiving $0 instead of $2400 outweighs the upside of receiving 
$2500 instead of $2400, but this $100 difference in payoffs outweighs the 0.01 difference in the probability 
of winning. The explanation of SWUP for the choice of 𝑞 over 𝑝 is similar to Bordalo et al. (2012), with 
both explanations based on payoff salience. However, the Bordalo et al. explanation for the choice of 𝑝′ 
over 𝑞′ is based only on payoff salience and assumes that agents interpret the choice as between statistically 
independent prospects, and evaluate options as if they compare $2500 and $2400, $2500 and $0, $2400 and 
$0, and $0 and $0). It seems more likely to us that the choice between 𝑝′ and 𝑞′ is determined by the salience 
of payoffs ($2500 versus $2400) contrasted with the salience of probabilities (0.33 versus 0.34).  
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A.2  The Common Ratio Effect 
 We next provide a definition of the common ratio effect: 
Definition 8 (Common Ratio Effect): Consider the frames in Figure 14, where 𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, and 𝐜, 𝐩 ∈
(0,1). The common ratio effect holds if 𝐪 ≻̂ 𝐩 and 𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐪′.  
 
 
Figure 14.  The Common Ratio Effect 
 𝐩 𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩     𝐩′ 𝐱 𝐜𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐜𝐩 
 𝐪 𝐲 𝐩 𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐩     𝐪′ 𝐲 𝐜 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐜 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 5: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the common ratio effect if and only if  
𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐜𝐩, 𝐜).    
Remark: For the example of the common ratio effect in Figure 3, the necessary and sufficient condition in 
Proposition 5 becomes 𝜇(0, 3000) > 𝜇(4000, 3000) > 𝜙(0.20, 0.25). That is, the common consequence 
effect holds if the perceived downside of receiving 0 instead of 3000 outweighs the perceived upside of 
receiving 4000 instead of 3000, but this $1000 difference in payoffs outweighs the 0.05 difference in the 
probability of winning.  These conditions also hold for the parameter-free specification in (9). 
 
A.3 The Peanuts Effect 
 Next, we provide a definition of the peanuts effect: 
Definition 9 (Peanuts Effect): Consider Figure 15, where 𝐱 > 𝟎 and 𝐩 ∈ (0,1). The peanuts effect holds 
if 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 and there is some 𝐤 > 𝟏 such that 𝐪′ ≻̂ 𝐩′. 
 
Figure 15.   The Peanuts Effect 
 
 
 𝐩 𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩     𝐩′ 𝐤𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩 
 𝐪 𝐱𝐩 𝐩 𝐱𝐩 𝟏 − 𝐩    𝐪′ 𝐤𝐱𝐩 𝐩 𝐤𝐱𝐩 𝟏 − 𝐩 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 6: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the peanuts effect if and only if   
𝜇(𝐱𝐩, 𝐱) > 𝜇(𝐱𝐩, 𝟎)  and  𝜇(𝐤𝐱𝐩, 𝟎) > 𝜇(𝐤𝐱𝐩, 𝐤𝐱).         
 
 
A.4 The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes  
We next demonstrate that, for linear utility, SWUP implies the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes for 
any salience function 𝜇 that satisfies ordering, diminishing absolute sensitivity, and increasing proportional 
sensitivity. Our approach is to demonstrate that half of the fourfold pattern (risk aversion for gains and risk 
seeking for losses of high probability) is implied by ordering and DAS. We then demonstrate that the other 
half of the fourfold pattern (risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability) is implied 
by IPS. We first provide a simple behavioral definition of commonly observed risk preferences: 
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Definition 10 (Risk preferences at moderate to high probabilities): Consider the frames in Figure 16 of 
a choice between a representation 𝐩 of a lottery 𝑝 and its expected value, 𝐄(𝐩), where 𝐱 > 𝐲 ≥ 0.  
(i) Risk aversion for gains at moderate to high probabilities holds if 𝐄(𝐩) ≻̂ 𝐩 for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1). 
(ii) Risk seeking for losses at moderate to high probabilities holds if  𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐄(𝐩′) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1). 
Figure 16.  Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To isolate the role of salience perceptions in governing risk attitudes, we state the following proposition for 
the case where the utility function is linear.  
Lemma 1: Consider the frames in Figure 16 and let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏] a focal thinker is 
risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses if 𝜇 satisfies ordering and DAS. 
Proof: For 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱, 𝐄(𝐩) ≻̂ 𝐩 if and only if 𝜇(𝐲, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲). 
For 𝑝 = 0.5, DAS implies 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲))  > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). To see that DAS implies that this 
inequality holds, let 𝛜 = 0.5(𝑥 − 𝑦). Then 𝜇(𝐲 + 𝛜, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲) + 𝛜) = 𝜇(𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲), 𝐱), which by 
symmetry, equals 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). For 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1], note that [𝐱, 𝐱𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏)] ⊆ [𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)] 
and thus ordering implies 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) ≥ 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩
𝟏
)). Thus, 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) >
 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩
𝟏
)) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1]. The result for losses follows analogously. ∎ 
For the case where 𝐩
𝟏
= 0.5, Lemma 1 requires only DAS. In conjunction with DAS, ordering 
implies that the result extends to all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏]. This stronger result implies that if we observe risk-
seeking for gains or risk aversion for losses, such behavior will occur at low probabilities, consistent with 
the experimental observation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
Whereas DAS and ordering have implications for risk preferences at moderate and high 
probabilities, IPS has implications for risk preferences over low probability outcomes. Consider the frames 
in Figure 17, where we set 𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 𝟐, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪). Frames (i) and (ii) each involve a choice 
between a sure option and a mean-preserving spread. Setting 𝐤 ≥ 2 ensures that the payoff with the largest 
absolute value occurs at low probabilities. For 𝐤 = 2,  we have 𝐩𝟏 = 1/3, independent of 𝐱, and 𝐩𝟏 
decreases toward 0 as 𝐤 increases, holding 𝐱 fixed. In the figure, 𝐩𝟏 is the unique value determined by the 
requirement that 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪).  For 𝐱 = $1, and 𝐤 = 1,000,000, the choice in frame (i) resembles the 
decision of purchasing a lottery ticket (𝐩𝟏 ~ 0.000001), and the choice in frame (ii) resembles the decision 
                  Risk Aversion for Gains                                   Risk Seeking for Losses 
 
(i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)     (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)   (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐄(𝐩) 𝐄(𝐩) 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩) 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩
′) 𝐄(𝐩′) 𝐩𝟏 𝐄(𝐩
′) 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  
𝐩 𝐱 𝐩𝟏 𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 𝐩′ −𝐱 𝐩𝟏 −𝐲 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  
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to insure against low-likelihood disasters. For such large values of 𝐤 relative to 𝐱, the payoff 𝐱/𝐤 is 
essentially 0 and its inclusion may be viewed as merely a technical condition. Thus, for large 𝐤 and small 
𝐱, the frames in Figure 16 approximate a choice between a lottery with one non-zero outcome occurring 
with probability 𝐩𝟏, and its expected value. Formally, we have the following definition:  
Definition 11 (Risk Preference at low probabilities): Consider frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 17, where 
𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 2, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪):  
(i) Risk-seeking for gains at low probabilities holds if 𝐪 ≻̂ 𝐩.                  
(ii) Risk aversion for losses at low probabilities holds if 𝐩′ ≻̂ 𝐪′ 
Figure 17.  Increasing Proportional Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lemma 2: Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 17, a focal thinker is risk-seeking for 
gains at low probabilities and risk-averse for losses at low-probabilities if 𝜇 satisfies IPS. 
Proof: We show that IPS implies risk-seeking for low-probability gains. Risk aversion for low probability 
losses follows analogously. Given 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱, a focal thinker always chooses 𝐪 over 𝐩 if and only if  
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)(𝐱 − 𝐱𝐤)𝐩
𝟏
+ 𝜇 (𝐱,
𝐱
𝐤
) (𝐱 −
𝐱
𝐤
) (𝟏 − 𝐩
𝟏
) < 0. Since 𝐸(𝐩) = 𝐸(𝐪), we have: 𝐩𝟏 =
𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤)
𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤)
. 
Thus, 𝐪 is strictly preferred to 𝐩 if and only if   
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)(𝐱 − 𝐱𝐤) [
𝟏 − (𝟏/𝐤)
𝐤 − (𝟏/𝐤)
] + 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤)(𝐱 − 𝐱/𝐤) [
𝐤 − 𝟏
𝐤 − (𝟏/𝐤)
] < 0, 
which can be rewritten as  𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤)𝐱 [
(𝐤−𝟏)(𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤)
𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤)
] < 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)𝐱 [
(𝐤−𝟏)(𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤))
𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤)
], which implies 
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤) < 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱). Then by symmetry and increasing proportional sensitivity, we have          
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱) = 𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐱) = 𝜇 (𝐤𝐱, 𝐤 (
𝐱
𝐤
)) > 𝜇 (𝐱,
𝐱
𝐤
). The result for losses follows analogously. ∎ 
Definition 12 (Fourfold pattern): An agent who is risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses at high 
probabilities, as defined in Definition 10, and is risk-seeking for gains and risk-averse for losses at low 
probabilities, as in Definition 11, exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk preferences.   
Proposition 3 (Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences): Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, a focal 
thinker exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk preferences if 𝜇 satisfies ordering, DAS, and IPS.  
  
                                                                     Lottery Purchase                                               Insurance  Purchase          
 
 
(i) (x1,y1)   (p1,q1)    (x2,y2)     (p2,q2)   (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1)  (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
𝐩 𝐱 𝐩𝟏  𝐱 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  𝐩′ −𝐱 𝐩𝟏  −𝐱 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏   
𝐪 𝐤𝐱 𝐩𝟏  𝐱/𝐤 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏  𝐪′ −𝐤𝐱 𝐩𝟏  −𝐱/𝐤 𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏   
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A.5 The Hidden Zero Effect for Choice under Risk 
 We next provide a formal definition of the hidden zero effect for risk: 
Definition 13: (Hidden Zero Effect for Risk): Consider the two choice frames in Figure 18, for which 
𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, 𝐪 > 𝐩, and 𝐩, 𝐪 ∈ (0,1). The Hidden Zero Effect for risk holds if 𝐩 ≻̂ 𝐪 in the simpler (top) 
frame and 𝐪 ≻̂ 𝐩 in the “salient downside risk” (bottom) frame.   
 
  Figure 18. The Hidden Zero Effect for Risk 
    P 𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐩   
   𝐪  𝐲 𝐪 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐪   
 
    
 
 𝐩 𝐱 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐪 𝟎 𝐪 − 𝐩 
 𝐪 𝐲 𝐩 𝟎 𝟏 − 𝐪 𝐲 𝐪 − 𝐩 
 
 
Proposition 7: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the hidden zero effect for risk if and only 
if 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪). 
 
A.6 The Cancellation Effect 
The Cancellation Effect in intertemporal choice can be defined as follows:  
Definition 14: Consider the frames in Figure 19 where 𝐲 > 𝐱 > 𝟎, and 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 𝟎.  The Cancellation 
effect holds if SS ≻̂ LL and LL′ ≻̂ SS′. 
Figure 19. The Cancellation Effect 
 
 𝐒𝐒 𝐱 𝐫  SS′ 𝐱 𝐫 𝐳 𝐬        𝟎 𝐭 
𝐋𝐋 𝐲 𝐭  LL′ 𝟎 𝐫 𝐳 𝐬     𝐲 𝐭 
 
 
Proposition 8: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the cancellation effect if and only if 
𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲). 
The cancellation effect also requires 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎) < 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) but this inequality is guaranteed by the ordering 
property. For the example in Figure 4, the condition in Proposition 8 becomes 𝜃(0, 2) > 𝜇(520,530) which 
holds for the parameter-free specification in (9) and is consistent with intuition that the difference between 
a 0 time delay and a 2-month delay is more salient than the difference between $520 and $530. 
A.7 The Common Difference Effect 
 We next provide a formal definition of the common difference effect. 
Definition 15 (Common Difference Effect): Consider frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 20, for any 𝐲 > 𝐱 >
0, 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 0, and any 𝚫 > 0. The common difference effect holds if 𝐒𝐒 ~̂ 𝐋𝐋 implies 𝐋𝐋′ ≻̂ 𝐒𝐒′. 
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Figure 20.  Properties of Time Preferences Predicted by SWUP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1:  A focal thinker exhibits the common difference effect if and only if  𝜃 satisfies DAS.  
Proof: Note that a focal thinker views 𝐒𝐒 and 𝐋𝐋 to look equally good if and only if (11) holds: 
(11)         𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑢(𝐲) − 𝑢(𝐱))(𝛿𝐫 + 𝛿𝐭) = 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭)(𝛿𝐫 − 𝛿𝐭)(𝑢(𝐲) + 𝑢(𝐱)).     
A focal thinker always chooses 𝐋𝐋′ over 𝐒𝐒′ if and only if inequality (12) holds: 
(12)         𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑢(𝐲) − 𝑢(𝐱))(𝛿𝐫+∆ + 𝛿𝐭+∆) > 𝜃(𝒓 + 𝚫, 𝒕 + 𝚫)(𝛿𝐫+∆ − 𝛿𝐭+∆)(𝑢(𝐲) + 𝑢(𝐱)).        
By factoring out 𝛿∆ and by substitution, we see that the common difference effect holds if and only if we 
have 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜃(𝐫 + 𝚫, 𝐭 + 𝚫), which holds for any ∆> 0 if and only if 𝜃 satisfies DAS. ∎ 
For the typical example in Figure 3, the common difference effect holds for the specification in (9). 
 
A.8 The Magnitude Effect  
 The magnitude effect can be defined as follows: 
Definition 16 (Magnitude Effect): Consider frames (i) and (iii) in Figure 20. The magnitude effect holds 
if for all 𝐤 > 1, SS ≻̂  LL and LL′ ≻̂ SS′. 
Proposition 9: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆)  =  𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the magnitude effect if and only if 
𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐤𝐲) > 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲). 
Note that if 𝜇 satisfies IPS, we have 𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐤𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) for all 𝐤 > 𝟏.  
 Next, we state and prove our finding on the bias toward concentration from Section 3.4, and then 
demonstrate a more formal result for the hidden zero effect over time. 
A.9 The Bias Toward Concentration 
Proposition 2 (Bias Toward Concentration): Let  𝛿 = 1 and 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then if 𝜇 satisfies ordering, a 
focal thinker exhibits a bias toward concentration.  
Proof:  In the undiscounted case, for 𝐱 < 0, we have 𝜇(𝐧𝐱, 𝟎)𝐧𝐱 < 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎)𝐧𝐱 in the choice between A and 
B and also in the choice between A′ and B′, which hold for all 𝐧 > 1 if 𝜇 satisfies ordering. Conversely, 
for 𝐱 > 0, we have 𝜇(𝐧𝐱, 𝟎) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎) in the choice between A and B, and in the choice between A′ and 
B′, which hold for all 𝐧 > 1 if 𝜇 satisfies ordering. ∎ 
 
   Simple Consumption Plans      The Common Difference Effect        The Magnitude Effect 
   (i) (x1,y1) Period          (ii) (x1,y1)    Period    (iii) (x1,y1) Period 
  SS 𝐱 𝐫  SS′ 𝐱 𝐫 + ∆  SS′ 𝐤𝐱 𝐫 
 LL 𝐲 𝐭  LL′ 𝐲 𝐭 + ∆  LL′ 𝐤𝐲 𝐭 
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A.10 The Hidden Zero Effect for Choice over Time 
Definition 17: Consider Figure 21, where 𝒚 > 𝒙 ≥ 𝟎, and 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 𝟎.  The Hidden Zero effect for time 
holds if SS ≻̂ LL in the left frame and LL ≻̂ SS in the ‘salient opportunity cost’ (right) frame. 
Figure 21. The Hidden Zero Effect 
 
𝐒𝐒 𝐱 𝐫  SS 𝐱 𝐫 𝟎 𝐭  
𝐋𝐋 𝐲 𝐭  LL 𝟎 𝐫 𝐲 𝐭  
 
 
Proposition 10: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the hidden zero effect for time if and 
only if 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲). 
For the example in Figure 9, the condition in the proposition holds for the specification in (9).  
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